A new global security order is emerging. The expert on foreign policy and international relations Professor Dr Thomas Jäger on European security deficits and Russia’s hybrid warfare.

Interview: Eva Schissler

Professor Jäger, when was the world safer: before 1990 – during the Cold War – or today?

Definitely back then. As a result of World War II, two world powers – or superpowers – emerged in the 1950s and 60s. Apart from some local conflicts in Africa, the situation was relatively stable from the mid-1970s, after the wars in Korea and Vietnam. The USA and the Soviet Union were, to a certain extent, saturated at the time; they were satisfied with what they had. The main line of conflict in Europe, where the superpowers faced each other, remained peaceful.

What's different today?

Today, there are two powers, China and Russia, which are not saturated; they believe that they deserve a place in the sun that they do not yet occupy. They want to have a greater influence on international issues. To varying degrees, both countries are currently trying to enforce this claim with violent means. In this respect, the situation is much more volatile. One could say that we are currently in a phase of transition: The stable bipolar order of the East-West conflict has dissolved and the unipolar moment of the United States is coming to an end. But a new global order is not created by sitting down at the table and saying: “Let’s see what we can agree on.” It is created by a trial of strength. States do this with military, economic and political means.

Some people dreamed of a multipolar world with several power centres and without superpowers – for a certain time at least. Was that an illusion?

In any case it is an illusion to believe that such a constellation would make the world safer. If we look back in history, bipolar constellations are actually the most stable. Negotiations are easier because only two parties have to agree. The more political powers are involved, the more difficult it becomes. Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a multipolar order. It was not stable at all. If only one country switched to another alliance, the order became unstable.

I also see a lot of confusion about the term ‘multipolar’. First of all, the academic concept of multipolarity is that three or more powers are significantly more powerful than all others. This is measured in military and economic strength, in political alliance formation and in cultural attractiveness. Multipolarity as defined by Russia and China means: no American domination. Theirs is a concept in which large states have an exclusive zone of influence around them. The US should therefore stay out of Europe and the Pacific. Thirdly, there is the concept of multipolarity as it is used in Europe. Here it means that everybody can have their say and we won’t let anyone tell us what to do. But it is self-deception to believe that states can escape the influence of superpowers. In any case, the latter two meanings have nothing to do with an analytical description of the international world order.

Which concept will prevail?

The question is who the future world powers will be. Some observers believe that the new order will be multipolar, by means of the BRICS states, for example. They regard this alliance as an emerging global power. Others – including myself – see a nation-state-oriented order with the United States and China as the dominant forces. International organizations will not be their own fields of force.

BRICS – The founding countries in 2006 were Brazil, Russia, India and China. In 2010, South Africa was added, followed by Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates in 2024.

The BRICS countries have changed from an economic alliance of so-called ‘emerging economies’ into an alliance with political aspirations, sometimes compared to the G7. What is its role?

Currently, BRICS accounts for about a quarter of global economic performance. This is not insignificant, but mainly attributable to China. China, by far the strongest economic force in this alliance, wants to emancipate itself from the American-dominated international organizations and show: we can do it, too. Their aim is to establish an alternative world order through economic performance in which the US dollar is replaced as the world’s key currency. But the dollar still dominates the yuan decisively. The other currencies of the BRICS member states play no role at all on the global market.
 

What is the incentive for other states to join?

For them, the alliance resembles an arena. It offers them the opportunity to have their say and meet with the world’s powerful players. Especially as hosts of a meeting, they can express their interests on the global stage.

In my view, however, BRICS will not become an order-defining international organization in the foreseeable future because the alliance is not very coherent. Looking ahead to the coming decades, India will be the most interesting state in this organization. The Chinese economy remains large but will no longer grow at the rates we have seen in recent decades. According to all forecasts, in fifty years India, together with China and the US, will be far stronger than all other economies. So why should India allow itself to be harnessed by such an alliance?
 

Europe wants to become more independent from the US in terms of security policy. Is that realistic?

No.

I thought so.

The EU is a post-imperial construct that has set itself the goal of no longer redrawing borders – except peacefully. As a security community, the member states do not threaten each other or plan any defensive measures against each other. As long as these basic principles are accepted, all other conflicts are allowed. Looking at this security aspect alone, Russia has a very different idea of order in Europe. Russia is trying to assert its political influence on the European continent in order to create an imperialist zone of influence.

The EU could have safeguarded against this threat, which has been known basically since the year 2000. However, it did not do anything, but only talked about it. That is why we are now in a situation where none of the EU states are able to defend their territory, and neither is the EU as a whole. It is not even capable of resolving a conflict like the one in Kosovo! That is the difference in dimensions we are talking about: Kosovo – Russia.

Are Europe’s security efforts since the start of the war in Ukraine not moving in the right direction?

We often heard that Europe needs a Pearl Harbour moment to finally wake up. 24 February 2022 was that moment, but far too little is still happening – even in Germany, despite everyone talking about a ‘new era’ (Chancellor Olaf Scholz coined the term Zeitenwende shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – ES). To create military capabilities that could deter other countries, the EU needs five to ten years. Due to its own inability, it still depends on the Americans to provide this deterrence.
 

France, the only state with nuclear weapons in the EU, offered to help build a European missile defence system years ago. Could that be the solution? 

I do not believe that Europe will have a nuclear deterrent in the long term. Who should be in charge? The President of the Commission? Or would the nuclear briefcase be passed from country to country? Nuclear weapons are political weapons. The EU is unable to form a stable, unified political will, which makes it impossible for the EU to project credible nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, it is good that we are having this conversation because it also reveals the pitfalls of useless alternatives.
 

What about NATO? Is it willing and able to defend Europe if worst comes to worst?

NATO is stronger today than it has been in recent decades. It has more members and many states are increasing their defence budgets. But it suffers from the same problem: the US is the only capable military power in NATO. It is therefore important who is in power in that county. The American president guarantees deterrence with his word. Everyone knows that the Americans have the ability. However, they must always make it clear that they also have the intention. Recently, we have repeatedly seen that this is no longer a matter of course. Donald Trump showed us this very drastically with his statements that he would no longer defend defaulting NATO partners if he were to become president again.

Europe is afraid of Russia, but its attack on Ukraine has also revealed significant weaknesses. Are we over- or underestimating Russia’s strength?

We would be overestimating Russia if we looked only at its military potential and weaponry. The country has shown that it is not good in combat. The offensive in Ukraine was poorly executed and the troops are poorly equipped. However, this does not mean that they are unable to learn from these mistakes. A new attack on Kiev with the aim of overturning the government would probably be carried out very differently.

Their strength: Russia is the only state in the world that uses the threat of nuclear weapons in a politically offensive manner. Russia also masters disinformation and effectively dominates discourse spaces. It has proxies in all European states. In Germany, these parties receive almost 30 percent of votes. If such forces managed to take over the government, there would be no need to invade with military force. If two to three key states in Europe were won, then the others would fall as well. So the idea that Russia has to overrun Europe with tanks in order to ‘advance on the Rhine’ is not true. Today other instruments are available whose functioning is not even understood yet by large segments of the German public.
 

What is the best- and what is the worst-case scenario for a new security order?

It depends for whom. Let us say, for a democratic Germany in a democratic Europe. The best-case scenario would be stable transatlantic relations and the ability to deter Russia from further military attacks. If this is combined with successful alliance formation in the Pacific that prevents China from attacking Taiwan, we would have a stable situation again. It would not be entirely safe, because it would be challenged from time to time, but there would be a certain stability.

A dangerous situation would be if the United States came to the conclusion that they no longer need Europe. That is what Putin is hoping for. The Europeans would be defenceless and fragmented, competing over who can get back on good terms with Moscow as quickly as possible. But even this situation would not turn out the way Putin might hope. China would quickly make it clear who is at the helm in Europe, too. It is also up to us Europeans to prevent this scenario.