Libya, Iraq and Syria. Sudan, Somalia or the Central African Republic – the list of so called failed states, states that are no longer able to fulfill their basic functions, is long and keeps getting longer. In the past twenty years, more and more states that were once stable appear to be imploding. Civil war, international terrorism and streams of refugees are the consequences. Why do states fall apart? And is there a way out? Professor Thomas Jäger from the Department of Political Science is an expert in international relations. His answers shed new light on western perceptions of successful statehood.
When the State Fails
by Robert Hahn
What appears to be an apocalyptic vision of doomsday is the bitter reality of many people’s lives around the world: civil war, hunger, epidemics, corruption. Whether in Somalia or Syria, Libya or Iraq – for approximately twenty years, the phenomenon of failed states has been on the rise. Streams of refugees and terrorism are the result. In our globalized world, this also affects states in otherwise stable Europe. Regional and world powers often try to put an end to the bloodshed by means of military interventions or political resolutions. But they often fail because local elites profit from the chaos.
Does the state fulfill all of its functions?
What is a failed state and what causes a state to fail? How can states escape this situation? Professor Thomas Jäger from the Department of Political Science is an expert in international relations and security policy. As the editor of the Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik [Journal of Foreign and Security Policy], he is at the center of current security policy discussions. He has written several books on topics such as terrorism and security. For the political scientist, weak or failed states are, first and foremost, a problem that has to do with our own conceptions of statehood: »It is a western understanding that a state must have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and fulfill certain central functions such as providing a health care and a social welfare system, or upholding public safety and order. If it does not fulfill these functions, we see it as a weak state,« he explains. There are a lot of different variations: from weak states that no longer fulfill some of their basic functions to fully failed states that cannot uphold their monopoly on the use of force and collapse. In this context, political scientists generally distinguish between international and domestic causes.
Globalization as a catalyst of economic decline
One important reason for the failure of states is their national and international economic system. From colonialism to today’s economic order, asymmetrical exploitation dominates relations between the highly developed countries on the one hand and the developing countries on the other, with the latter serving as suppliers of raw materials. Various states – mostly located in the southern hemisphere – thus do not succeed in developing self-sustaining economies. Likewise, there are domestic reasons that mostly have to do with governance, including corruption and an incompetent public administration, which often leads to a lack of legitimacy among citizens.
In the past, these states were fragile but self-contained. At most, internal conflicts had an effect on their direct neighbors. Today, everything is connected to the world market. »Crude oil is being exported even from para-state regions in Syria,« says Jäger. »There is a constant flow of goods, giving all parties involved in civil wars the opportunity to buy new weapons, mobilize new recruits and provide new services.« Closed civil war economies turn into open civil war economies. »Wherever there are natural resources that can be mined, transported and sold, the situation is cemented. In Afghanistan, it is poppy; in the Middle East, oil.«
The end of the East-West conflict
The interest world powers have in certain geopolitical regions is also a significant factor. Particularly during the East-West conflict, the two superpowers were interested even in remote regions, and many states remained functional because their allies – the United States or the Soviet Union – supported them. With the end of the Cold War, these regions lost their geopolitical importance.
Thomas Jäger sees two parallel processes at work here that have to do with the end of the East-West conflict. »For one thing, a number of local conflicts were frozen and have now flared up again. Somalia, Ethiopia and the founding of Eritrea, for example. Others simply lost their protecting powers. As a consequence, the weakness of these states suddenly became apparent.« During the East-West conflict, nobody could seriously challenge the legitimacy of these regimes because the US or Soviet armies would have intervened in any rebellions. »Moreover, when the superpowers stopped their financial support, competition for the scarce resources that remained increased among local elites. State institutions came away emptyhanded.«
What is to be done?
For more than twenty years, political scientists have thought about what we can do to stop the deterioration of states. What are the answers they have come up with? How can we prevent the failing of states? »Actually, the answer is that we do not know,« Jäger concedes. In the state building model, one idea is to establish a well-functioning public administration that fulfills its duties and raises the acceptance of the state among its citizens and among the elites.
In the past, however, local elites that control certain territories have succeeded in blocking such endeavors. »The ruling elites do not automatically aim at reestablishing statehood because it might diminish their intakes from their shady dealings. In these fragile states, some actors are making immense profits,« Jäger notes. But how can we get local elites to cooperate? Does it help to offer money in exchange for fighting corruption? Again, the political scientist is critical: »More money for more cooperation in a situation that is already marked by corruption is the wrong incentive. The money simply disappears into dark channels.«
The large-scale projects that were launched in recent years in Iraq and Libya have moreover shown that this incentive does not work. Ten years into the state building project, it has consumed tremendous resources and is about to fail.
An uncertain future
Are states in which we have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force not the measure of all things? »We assume that a state needs a government with such a monopoly. However, empirical findings have shown that there are a number of states with legitimate oligopolies.« Not only for the states in question, but also for their neighbors, however, many problems such as streams of refugees and terrorism remain »Migration from areas with fragile statehood will increase. In the past, this was difficult to organize. Today, it has become relatively easy through Facebook groups and Twitter,« Jäger is sure. However, he cannot offer a very positive outlook. Instead he draws our attention to another region in crisis: »If we look at how insecure and weak many states in Africa are, and in light of the demographic development of the continent, we are speaking about billions, not millions of people at our borders. It is the greatest challenge that Europe will one day face, and it will have to find an answer to this key question: How can we foster stable, peaceful and well-organized societies?